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Movimento-revista de educação, Niterói, ano 4, n.6, p.131-150, jan./jun. 2017. notebook, we again read: "'human nature' is the 'complex of social relations '" (Q7 §35, SPN p. 355, February-November 1931) . In a relatively late note of great interest "Nature, against nature, artificial etc." (Q16 §12, after February 1934) he once more emphasizes that "the 'nature' of man is the ensemble of social relationships that determine a historically defined consciousness" and that this "'nature' of man" is dynamic in that it "is not something homogeneous for all men in all eras". Social relations condensed in each one of us, in humanity, is then a recurring theme in at least these "middle period" monographic Notebooks.
A particular and original conception of what the historical bloc consists of comes in the tenth notebook. Here we again read in one passage that "man" is "the ensemble [l'insieme] of social relations" (Q10II §48II, SPN p. 359, December 1932), while in the same paragraph Gramsci goes on to a further definition in saying that: "humanity", "human nature" or "human kind" (il genere umano) is a "historical bloc of purely individual and subjective elements and of mass and objective or material elements", in other words a crystallization of the bloc of structure and superstructures. The "'historical bloc' presupposed by Sorel" 4 and "events which set "social 'totality', the whole conceivable human kind", the whole 'spirit' in motion" are then brought together in another sub-section of the same paragraph 48 (Q10II §41X, and it is here that we see one of
Gramsci's great innovations. Marx's metaphor of the structure (or base) and superstructure of society (see the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, also partially translated by Gramsci in prison: QdC p. 2358) had been and often still does tend to be read as representing a static state of affairs. Gramsci in this same note observes however that in Marx "there is contained in a nutshell the ethico-political aspect of politics or theory of hegemony and consent, as well as the aspect of force and of the economy". 5 It is the element of hegemony that brings more explicitly into play the dynamic element of the metaphor, although it should be added that Marx's "economic structure of society, the real base" understood as "the ensemble of these relations of production", is a much more dynamic entity, even in this "nutshell" formulation, than it has often been given credit for. With his usual insight, Raymond Williams emphasized the dynamic aspect of Marx's formulation: "we have to say that when we talk of 'the base', we are talking of a process, and not a state".
6
There, then, is a striking similarity -in Notebooks 10 and 13, and also elsewhere -between the linguistic formulations used for human kind, the historical bloc and the totality, all referring to concepts whose difference is more apparent than real.
Gramsci is at pains to defend the unity of the bloc, while recognizing the special position of the economic base, as for example in Q10II §41XII (FSPN, p. 397) : "the economy is to society what the anatomy is in the biological sciences", explicitly referenced in this paragraph to Marx's dictum in the 1859 Preface to the Critique of Political Economy that "the anatomy of […] civil society […] has to be sought in political economy". On this, he notes that Croce, the object of a polemic here, had himself given priority to the structure as "the point of reference and of dialectical impetus for the superstructures, in other words the 'distinct moments of the spirit'", citing here Croce's own concepts. Croce's solution (though perhaps not the phrase) of a "dialectic of distincts" was for Gramsci "the merely verbal solution to a real methodological exigency" (Q10II §41x; FSPN, p. 400), which in
his case was to demonstrate the interconnections between the elements composing the historical bloc. Gramsci then goes on to ask rhetorically whether 5 The FSPN translation has "economics" for l'economia but, on reflection, "the economy" is more convincing. 6 Raymond Williams, Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory, "New Left Review" I, 82, 1973, p. 34 For a long time the equation of historical bloc and the totality was largely ignored.
The great exception among the early studies of Gramsci is provided by the philosopher Cesare Luporini, 8 who clearly and explicitly states that "base and superstructure constitute a totality (in the Hegelian meaning of the term)" before going on to add that the "base-superstructure totum (is) what Gramsci calls the 'historical bloc'", within which the reciprocity of action of one on the other has its origin in the base.
Why, then, instead of "historical bloc", does Gramsci not simply take over the Hegelian-Marxian terminology of "totality" or "social form", given especially that he does speak on a number of occasions of "social form" or "form of society" (see e.g. Q10II § §15, 25, 27 and 30, FSPN pp.167, 165, 168 and 171, all dating to summer 1932, or Q13 § §27 and 35, last quarter of 1933 or early '34) or, indeed, the straightforwardly Marxist one of "social formation"?
Here, two separate things must be borne in mind. The first is that Gramsci had a special regard for the terms used. Conceptually then, the historical bloc has its origins in Sorel, as Gramsci himself says, but, as this reconstruction shows, it is heavily influenced by the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach and is, in fact, Gramsci's reinterpretation of the Marxian concept of the social totality, with emphasis placed on the bloc's dynamic character, to which we shall now turn our attention.
Hegemony as "cement" and as "driving force"
Apart from the question of reciprocal action between base and superstructure, another feature common both to the historical bloc and to social totality is their property of temporal dynamism (see above). Livio Sichirollo, 9 however, links the mutual conditioning of structure and ideology within the historical bloc to notions of progress and to the process of becoming (citing for these latter notions a paragraph already cited -Q10II §48II, SPN p. 360 -headed by Gramsci "Progress Mario Spinella emphasizes that the Marxian totality (or "man-nature relationship in which man is simultaneously the object of nature and the subject of the transformation of nature itself") is a "dynamic totality, differentiated according to the various historical epochs". Hence the effort to define not a totality in general, but "the various historical forms" i.e. socio-economic formations "that the totality has assumed", "a historically determined totality". 12 Remembering the link made above between an "ensemble of (social) relations", the individual and the historical bloc, Gramsci, too, stresses that "the ensemble (l'insieme) of relations as they exist at any given time [...] must be known genetically, in their movement of formation, for each individual is not only the synthesis of existing relations but of the history of these relations, that is, he is a précis [riassunto] of all the past"
The concept of a dynamic totality is also constantly present in Lukács, who merits a few words apart since, in his hands, the notion of totality may have gone through a number of changes with time. The early History and Class Consciousness defines different types of the totality that he himself had reintroduced into the Movimento-revista de educação, Niterói, ano 4, n.6, p.131-150, jan./jun. 2017.
Marxist tradition (see above): in the space of half a dozen pages in the essay
Class Consciousness, we find him qualifying "totality" as "historical", "concrete"
(twice), "economic", "objective economic" and "true" (referred to the totality of production).
13 Towards the end of his life he was to refine this terminology by frequent recourse to the notion of "complexes" for more restricted categories, sometimes extended to unions of complexes, or to "complexes of complexes"
14
, in which what we may consider the 'primitive cell', in Lukács's words the "very atom of society" is human labour. 15 When Lukács does use the term "totality" in his last writings, it normally refers to the social totality (viz. the 'set of all sets'), this being a gloss on Lenin's "sphere of relationships of all classes and strata to the state and the government, the sphere of the interrelations between all classes", 16 with stress laid, in a way that recalls his early "Marxism of Rosa
Luxemburg", included in History and Class Consciousness, on "society on its historical dynamic" or the "dynamic totality" formed by "the overall socio-historic process". 17 Thus, via Lenin, Lukács arrives at something very close indeed to the "social totality ... in motion" of Gramsci's Q10II §41x; however, different from his concept of hegemony, Gramsci does not explicitly link this particular concept to Lenin and neither, in Under the aspect of change and dynamism, for Gramsci everything is subject to change, even the philosophy of praxis itself:
That the philosophy of praxis thinks of itself in a historicist manner, that is as a transitory phase of philosophical thought ... is made quite explicit in the wellknown thesis that historical development will at a certain point be characterized by the passage from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. ... The philosophy of praxis is an expression of historical contradictions ... If therefore it is demonstrated that contradictions will disappear, it is also demonstrated implicitly that the philosophy of praxis too will disappear or be superseded (Q11 §62; SPN pp. 404-5).
To put this in Gramscian terms, Marxism is an "absolute historicism": as a superstructure, it will itself wither away with the advent of the regulated society, i.e. when civil society reabsorbs political society and the superstructures actually do correspond to their base, so that Marx's dictum that human kind's acquisition of consciousness on the ideological and superstructural plane is no longer in contraposition to a consciousness stemming directly from the base.
How, however, does one move forward in society, to go from current conditions towards this regulated society? Not only the "solid blocs in movement" of Sorel but a whole line of Marxist analysis, indicated above, puts the emphasis on the dynamic aspect of totality. Hugues Portelli, 19 in observing that an examination of the concept of the historical bloc "cannot be considered separately from that of hegemony", singles out two aspects. Dominance over one's adversaries holds the bloc together but so does a hegemonic relationship with one's allies.
Hegemony is a "cement" that holds the bloc together. The metaphor springs readily to mind and is in fact used by Gramsci in Q10II §41IV, FSPN p. 474, where he defines hegemony as the "regulator (ordinatore) of the ideology which provides civil society and thus the State with its most intimate cement". But hegemony is also an important mechanism for giving a society its dynamism and direction. As he notes, from the times of the Enlightenment, society has been permeated with "the idea of progress" corresponding to "a widespread consciousness that [...] human kind as such [...] can conceive 'rationally' of plans through which to govern its entire life", with there being "no doubt that progress has been a democratic ideology", and, through the notion of "becoming", there has been an attempt to save "the most concrete aspect of 'progress' -movement, indeed dialectical movement" (Q10II §48II; SPN pp. 358-60).
It must be emphasized, against various misreadings of Gramsci, that hegemony has an economic component. The place where Gramsci probably makes this point most explicitly is in the thirteenth notebook: "if hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of the economy" (Q13 §18, SPN pp. 160-1). notes that under certain conditions, the "economic process is objectively effective as a 'second nature'", 21 yet again coming close to Gramsci in singling out the spontaneous acceptance of a structure, an acceptance that forms part and parcel of Gramsci's elaboration of the concept of "hegemony". For both thinkers, economic structures (now or in a future socialist society) establish a basis of development by arriving from below, and not by a process imposed from above, at the stage of the "collective man" or "social conformism" (cf. Q13 §7).
The internal articulation of the bloc
As with the emphasis placed on the "totality", stress is also laid on another The most orthodox concept of the dialectic in Gramsci is the one that comes directly from the Hegelian-Marxist line of the "unity of opposites", conceived as economic, it has its material basis in the decisive function exercised by the hegemonic group in the decisive core of the economy" (Q4 §38, PN Vol. II, p. 183). 21 Lukács, Ontology, cit., p. 92.
he says "not in the sense of a static and mystical coincidentia oppositorum but in that of a dynamic concordia discors (Q10II §4, FSPN p. 371). Gramsci's theorization seems influenced by the Sorelian concept of "cleavage" or "scission", but avoids the dangers of a barren and purely moralistic political extremism stemming from a rigid separation of two "extremes" of a contradiction, which could, for example, lead to a sterile workerism that accorded an exclusive position to the struggle between industrial proletariat and capitalists, or to Sorelian syndicalism or to economism (cf. Q13 §23, SPN in part on pp. 167-8 and the rest on pp.210-8). On this subject, Gramsci comments that, in any struggle, it is "a dialectical necessity, not an aprioristic method" that one of the "historical forces"
involved "should assume the role of 'synthesis', superseding the opposed extremes" (Q15 §60, summer 1933).
While Gramsci certainly does speak of the "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" triad of the Hegelian-Marxist vulgate, it is in the knowledge, first, that the final synthesis, as one sees from the above comments, is a complex one that must contain the outcome of a whole number of dialectical clashes taking place in the various subtotalities. Secondly, "in history as it really is the antithesis tends to destroy the thesis, the synthesis that emerges being a supersession, without one being able to tell in advance what of the thesis will be 'preserved' in the synthesis" (Q10I §6, alternative "closed" version of the dialectic, also stemming from Hegel but tending towards the realization of the "absolute idea".
FSPN, p. 342). A corollary of this is, as
Perhaps one of Gramsci's most original notions of dialectical synthesis is to be found in his discussion of "the culture represented by classical German philosophy, classical English economics, and French literature and political practice" as the three principal sources of Marxism. The combination of these three within Marxism is not for Gramsci a simple addition, but a dialectical operation to be understood in the sense that Marxism "synthesized the three movements, that is the entire culture of the age, and that in the new synthesis, whichever 'moment' one is examining, the theoretical, the economic or the political, one will find each of the three movements present as a preparatory 'moment'" (Q10II §9, SPN pp. 399-402; cf. also Q11 § §47-49, FSPN pp. 307-13).
A short digression is necessary to understand the nature of Gramsci's operation here. In Q13 §10 Gramsci attempts a translation of Croce's "distincts" into a historical materialist paradigm (or, from "speculative language into historicist language" in the task indicated explicitly in Q10I §7, April-May 1932; FSPN p.344), so that the Crocean distinctions are no longer "between the moments of the absolute Spirit, but between the levels of the superstructure". Gramsci then goes on to pose the question "how is the concept of a circle joining the levels of the superstructure to be understood? Concept of 'historical bloc', i.e. unity between nature and spirit (structure and superstructure), unity of opposites 24 and distincts" and asking whether one can "introduce the criterion of distinction into the structure, too" in categories like "'technique', 'labour', 'class'" (Q13 §10, SPN p. In other words what we have, then, is a base-superstructure totality articulated in different sub-totalities (complexes or sub-sets). Surface features in the superstructure may not necessarily be directly linked among themselves in having elements in common, where the Crocean "distincts" form, in effect, a "set"
or "complex of complexes", or where there may be no immediate apparent link between French politics, German philosophy and English classical economics. In other words they may not be in a direct dialectical relation one with another, but each is linked (possibly through a whole chain of cascading sub-sets) to the base.
Thus, one may "descend" from one complex towards the base and then "ascend" again towards another complex, independent of the first only apparently. It is in this way that there can exist a dialectical relationship between what, on the surface (superstructurally), seem unconnected complexes or sets and it is in this way that we can then understand Gramsci's comment that, taking the example of the three components of Marxism "in the new synthesis, whichever 'moment' one is examining, the theoretical, the economic or the political, one will find each of the three movements present as a preparatory 'moment'" because each is linked to ("determined in the last analysis by") the base. Here Gramsci fits into a whole tradition that rejects as too mechanical the simple thesis-antithesis-synthesis "triad". It is true that the words as such are there but the elements themselves are always complex, to the point that, in the situation where history proceeds by a leap, we have a case (to borrow a metaphor from optics) of the 'constructive interference', or superposition, of waves, i.e. here of the various complexes (sub-Movimento-revista de educação, Niterói, ano 4, n.6, p.131-150, jan./jun. 2017.
totalities or sub-sets); thus, on this occasion at least, Gramsci is at one with Althusser on what the latter describes as "overdetermination".
When there is a "leap", this is due to the full deployment of its "resources" by "each member of the dialectical opposition", leading, in Gramsci's words, to a interference', so that the antithesis is defused, the forces potentially comprising it not realizing they may have common interests and goals. However, over a long period, the ripples may change: expressed in terms of another metaphor, forces may mature within the womb of a society; as Gramsci notes (loc. cit.) this may often be a Vichian "ruse of nature" in which "a social impetus, directed towards one goal, achieves its opposite" (Q6 §168; PN p. 126) and in which (Q15 §11 again) a "war of position" turns into a "war of manoeuvre". Marx's phrase on this subject ("well grubbed, old mole") confirms that he -most of all -appreciated the long, patient working-out of the dialectical process of reality.
Some structural elements of Gramsci's discourse
Gramsci has enriched the language of politics through a number of terms, to which he gives a specific use and meaning. To mention only the ones that have been brought into play in this contribution, we have: historical bloc, hegemony, civil society, economic-corporative, absolute historicism, collective man and its synonym social conformism (an equivalence made in Q13 §7, SPN p. 242). A "collective man" then implies a "collective will", for which Gramsci equates one form of the modern prince to the political party "in which a collective will ... has to some extent asserted itself in action ... [and is] tending to become universal and total" (Q13 §1, SPN pp. 125-33; here p. 129). His lexis is however not neutral.
One cannot tear a term out of its context and use it, as it were, against the others or in ignorance of the others: the full understanding of the terms comes only from their use in context, i.e. the context of social reality and the 'co-text' of the rest of the discourse that interprets it. One might her refer to Wittgenstein's famous dictum that the meaning of a piece is its role in the game -perhaps a notion, though not the words themselves, borrowed by Wittgenstein from Gramsci through the mediation of their common friend Piero Sraffa. Again, a generation after Gramsci we have Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigm, in which any particular concept is interpretable only in terms of the other terms of an overall discourse.
Gramsci would however probably have had in mind an earlier formulation of this principle, due to Hegel, that an individual "fact" by itself is abstract and only takes on a meaning in the context of a totality (cf. Marx's "the concrete is concrete because it is a synthesis of many particular determinants" 25 or Lukács's HegeloMarxist "methodological supremacy of the totality over the individual parts"
26
).
Such is the case of Gramsci's concepts.
If, as a starting point, we take the historical bloc, which, as a philological analysis indicates, has one important source in the Theses on Feuerbach, and not just the explicitly acknowledged one in Sorel, this particular concept may be considered as standing at the top of the hierarchy, providing a governing context for the other 25 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. N.I. Stone, New York, 1904, p. 293 . A very similar phrase "the concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse" is also used by Marx in the Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 101. 26 Lukács, "What is Orthodox Marxism?" in History and Class Consciousness, cit., p. 9. terms. Using Gramsci's ideas regarding the translatability of scientific and philosophical languages, the description of the articulation of the bloc is in terms of a reinterpretation of Croce's distincts, taking account of the different levels of the structure and superstructure (cf. Q13 §10, SPN pp.136-8, especially p. 137).
The unity of the bloc is interpreted by Cesare Luporini as being mediated for
Gramsci "through the moments of history, culture, ideology, etc.". 27 Luporini also makes the comment that levels included in the structure-superstructure nexus include "the economy, politics, classes, ideology, hegemony etc.". Four stilts are driven into the ground but sway in the wind until a roof (the superstructure) is put on them; the roof is supported by the struts but at the same time it renders the base more stable.
29
However, another all-important role of hegemony, when linked to the notion used Looked at in this way the bloc (structure and superstructure, with the component of hegemony) is very much the zone where, to put it very succinctly and schematically, historicism and structuralism intersect and as such might be fruitfully compared with Lucien Goldmann's dialectical "genetic structuralist"
concept, which, in polemic with interpretations of Marx stemming from French structuralism, lays emphasis on relations "produced on the basis of previous historical situations" not only on "the relations of production that create historical situations". 30 Again returning to Lukács's discussion of social "complexes":
"society must be conceived, from the start, as a complex made up of complexes" and the task before us is to "comprehend genetically the rise and formation of these complexes".
31
When we consider how hegemony is formed and exercised, the role of civil society emerges as the locus for the resolution of conflict through one type or other of dialectical action. One type is a conservative tempered reformism, a type of "passive revolution", but the other consists of a mediation carried out by one of the forces which acts as a springboard for the next move forward in a set of shifting equilibria. This latter process of mediation, in the words of Nicola Badaloni, "may 'incorporate' within itself greater elements appropriate to the development of civilization, which after all is the theme of hegemony"; 32 for him, this is one aspect of Gramsci's "absolute historicism". While having certain reservations on historicism in general, Cesare Luporini defends Gramsci's historicism against the "speculative idealist" brand "generically founded on the metaphysical notion of becoming, and tending to superpose the ideal synthesis on the real movement of history, i.e. to mystify the dialectic, to 'force the world 34 He is however, I think, further away from at least the early Lukács's more "closed" concept of the dialectic which maintains "that -ultimately -the proletariat will be victorious", this being "guaranteed methodologically -by the dialectical method". those which stress social inertia, the resistance of the environment, and the material forces".
37
What we see in Gramsci is an exploration of the dialectic, rather than its attempted codification. The concept of totality, which has been emphasized in this reconstruction of Gramsci, began to disappear very soon after its rediscovery, as Gramsci observes on this point in Q13 §23 (SPN, p. 168), the task is to "liberate the economic thrust from the dead weight of traditional policies -i.e. to change the political direction of certain forces which have to be absorbed if a new, homogeneous politico-economic historical bloc, without internal contradictions, is to be successfully formed". 37 Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy (trans. H. V. White and R. Anchor), Cape Editions, London, 1969, p. 80. 38 Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 14. 39 Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 19. 
